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[A] troll hides under bridges, metaphorically speaking, waiting for
companies to produce and market products, that is, to approach and
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litigation, litigation that could result in an injunction halting the
product line.1
INTRODUCTION

Rightly or wrongly, patent trolls have emerged as the villains of the
intellectual property debate. 2 This article examines patent trolls and focuses
on patent rights and remedies; specifically the ability of patent trolls to
obtain injunctive relief subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.3 Therefore, Part I investigates the rise of patent
trolls and explores the differing perspectives on these entities. Part II is a
discussion of the patent right and existing remedies. Part III examines the
standard for issuing permanent injunctions prior to eBay. Part IV scrutinizes
all levels of eBay, culminating in the Supreme Court decision. Part V
analyzes the potential impact of eBay. Part VI comments on the creation of
the *Market Competition" requirement and patent practice as the two
determinative factors in post-eBay federal district court decisions. Part VII
analyzes the entrenchment of these factors and how it harms patent trolls.
Finally, this article concludes that curbing the ability of patent trolls to
obtain injunctive relief is beneficial because these entities undermine our
patent law system and exploit the applicable remedy.
I. THE PATENT TROLL

These maligned actors entered the spotlight and moved Intellectual
Property Law to center stage in 2006, when Virginia-based NTP, Inc.
("NTP"), apatent holding company, sued the Canadian makers of the wellknown BlackBerry wireless device, Research in Motion ("RIM").4 NTP

Donald S. Chisuii, Reforing Patet Lai Refor,

4J. MARSHAiL REV. INTELL. PROP. 1. 336,
340 (2005). Wikipcdia defines a patent troll as "a pejorative term used for a person or company that
enforces its patents against one or more alleged infringers in a manner considered unduly aggressive or
opportunistic." Wikipedia.org, Patent Troll, http://en.wiklpedia.org/wiki/Patent troll (last visited Mar.
25, 2009).
2
See Editorial, Potently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24. The neutral term
non practicing entity ("NPE") is also used to refer to patent trolls and for purposes of this article is used
interchangeably. See aeoeially Fed. Trade Comm'n, To PioioteInnovation:TheProperBalaneeofConpetition
and Patent Law end Policy (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter FTC], available at http:/'www.ftc,gov/os/2003/
10/innovationrpt.pdf.
3
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
4
See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1157 (2006). NTP filed suit against RIM on November 13, 2001, accusing RIM ofinfringing on
multiple patents. Id. at 1290. It originally alleged that over forty system and method patents-in-suit had
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owned five patents covering an email system, which integrated existing email
systems with RF wireless communications networks.' The ensuingtrial was
highly litigious, resulting ultimately in ajury finding that RIM had infringed
NTP's patents and an award of $54 million in damages to NTP) More
importantly, the district court entered a permanent injunction enjoining
RIM from further manufacture, use, importation, or sale of all accused
BlackBerry systems, software, and handhelds. Despite the questionable
validity of the asserted patents and RIM's contentions that it had a feasible
workaround strategy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("CAFC") affirmed and remanded. Nonetheless, the risk that an
injunction would dim BlackBerry screens world-wide had more than three
million subscribers in a frenzy that ultimately forced a settlement)8
A. Why Have Patent Trolls Succeeded and Why are They Bad?
The BlackBerry case illuminates the rise of the patent troll. However,
RIM is not the only major corporation that has had to the pay the toll.9 But
what are patent trolls and why have they succeeded? ° According to

been infringed. Id.
5
See id, at 1288-89.
6
See id. at 1291 92.
See id at 1292 The injunction was stayed pending appeal. 1d.
s
See Antony P. Ng. Blackberry Brouhaha, TEX. LAWYER, Dec, 25, 2006, at 3 1; Damian Myers,
Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was Ebay v. MereExchange Enough?, 14J. INTELL. PROP. L 333, 335 (2007).
Settlement figures upwards of $1 billion were circulated before RIM made a one-time payment of $612.5
million to avoid the injunction and received a license to all of NTP's patents. See Catherine Yang, The
BlackBerry Widow's Talc, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 2005, at 33; see also Press Release, Research in Motion and
NTP Sign Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation (Mar. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.blackberry.com/news/press/2006/pr 03 03 2006 01.shtml.
9
Good Technology and Nokia are among others to have paid large licensing fees to NTP. See
Myers, supra note 8, at 334. Likewise, in 2003, a patent troll demanded $8 billion from Intel for a patent
it bought for $50,000. In 2005 Medrad paid out $1.25 billion to a troll. See id, at 334 n.7. Other
noteworthy cases include: tiny patent holder Freedom Wireless, which von a $148.1 million award from
Boston Communications Group and four other companies over a patent for prepaid cell phone systems;
and PhoneTel, a Texas entity, which extracted more than $65 million in settlement from more than a
dozen technology and telecommunications companies in 2002 based on call-ID technology. See Greg
Griffin, TrollingfotPates,DENV. POST, Mar. 12, 2006, at K 01. In March, 2005, Burst.com also won
a $60 million settlement frim Microsoft Corp. See Peter Burrows, Undetdog orPatent Troll?, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 24, 2006, at 58, available at http://www.businesswek,com/magazine/content/06_17/b3981070.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
10
Recent definitions of patents trolls have focused on: (1) an enforcing entity's lack of active
competition with the infringer; (2) collection of nuisance-value settlements; (3) threat of litigation on
dubious patents; and (4) usage of patents as a means to generate revenue. See Miranda Jones, Note,
PermanentInjution, A Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently Not The Same: How eBay a. MercExehange
7
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Scandinavian folklore and its predecessor Norse mythology, trolls are
members of a fearsome humanoid race."1 Peter Detkin, then Assistant
General Counsel for Intel, coined the term "patent troll" to mean "someone
who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.",12 These
entities obtain patents and then wait until another individual or corporation's product or service potentially infringes on the patent. 3 Then, the
patent troll will aggressively seek to extract licensing fees and make threats

of litigation and the mighty permanent injunction if the fee is not paid.14
Often, the patents are of suspect validity or cover insignificant parts of the
overall product.15 Likewise, because the patent has not been previously
enforced and is often difficult to discover, the threat comes as a vexatious
surprise to a defendant, which explains the analogy to trolls that leap out and
demand tolls from unsuspecting travelers attempting to cross the troll's
bridge.16 Infringing companies generally choose to pay the licensing fees

Affects the Patet Rig/it oflNon-PracticingEntities, 14 GEO MASON L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2007).
11
Wikipedia.org, Trolls, http://cn.vikipedia.org/wiki/Trolls (last visited, Mar. 25, 2009)- Scott
Trimble, SCANDINAVIAN MYTHOLOGYAND FOLKLORE, 113, http:!/www.ststlocations.com/Arechives/
Scandinavian/Folklore/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
12
Brenda Sandburg, TrollingjorDollars, RECORDER,July 30, 2001. at 1.
13
See Myers, supra note 8, at 335.
14
See Victoria E. Luxardo, Towards a Solution To the Problem of Il/egitimate Patent Eqfoieient
Practieioin the United State.:An EquitableAffirmative Defense of "FairUe' i PateRit, 20 EMORY INTIL L. REV.
791,794(2006). This practice isreferred to as patent trolling. Patent trolling describes the act of hunting
down and acquiring unused patents to enforce against other companies using similar technology, as well
as threatening injunction to extort licensing fees. See Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory. The Troll Next Door,
6J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292,292 93 (2007).
15
The patent system has been criticized for granting both too high a volume of patents as well
as too many low-quality patents. See FTC, supra note 2, at 5 (providing a general discussion of lowquality patents). An additional problem is patent thickets:
A thicket exists when there are numerous patents held by different entities, each of which
may be technologically and legally distinct, but all of which overlap to cover actual con
mercial products. So, a company desiring legitimately to launch a product cannot do so
without getting multiple licenses, which may be difficult because of unreasonable independent demands or because it is too difficult to determine which of the patent "thorns" in the
thicket endanger the product.
Chisum, supra note 1, at 339; see also Myers, sutpra note 8, at 335.
16
A submarine patent is an example of apatent that may be difficult to discover. See, e.g., Reiffin
v. Microsoft Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 48,49 n.3 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Patents that remain 'subimerged' during
a long exparte examination process and then 'surface' upon the grant of the patent have been labeled
'submarine patents.' A holder of a 'submarine patent' may be able to demand high royalties from nonpatent holders who invested and used the technology not knowing that a patent would later be granted.").
The FTC explains that this occurs when:
a patent applicant allows its application to languish in the PTO while watching another
company make substantial investments in a technology or product that will infringe the yet-
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because redesign to avoid using the patented product is often too costly.17
A company may opt to challenge the patent, however, as the risk of having
business shut down via permanent injunction is too great and the cost of a
legal fight is too high or simply economically unfeasible." Therefore, coinpanies are compelled to pay the fees to avoid potential injunctions.1 9 Ulti-

mately, this has given trolls significant leverage in settlement negotiations,
which has led to criticism of the U.S. Patent System.20
The patent trolling enforcement racket is extremely lucrative because the
patent troll has all the leverage and almost nothing to lose. Because of the
inequality between the two parties, the patent troll more closely resembles
Goliath, while the alleged infringer is more akin to the weakling David.21
to-be-issued patent. Once the other company's sunk costs are large, the patent applicant
obtains the patent, asserts infringcment, and "holds up" the other company, demanding
supra-competitive royalties for a license to the "submarine patent."
FTC, supra note 2, at 26. Congress addressed this problem in 1999, by requiring publication of patent
applications within eighteen months. However, this requirement can still be avoided by filing for patent
protection only in the United States, which arguably isfrequently done by patent trolls. See 35 U.S.C.
S 122 (2000); see also Brief for Yahoo!, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05 130) [hereinafterYahoo!]; Gerard N. Magliocca,
Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTR DAME L. REV. 1809, 1814
(2007).
17
See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 1814; David V. Radack, Patent Trolls: Pay'Up or Fight?, LAW.
J., Aug. 4, 2006, at 3. Manufacturers often have to "choose between the risk of' being sued for
infringement after they sink costs into invention or production, or dropping innovative or productive
efforts altogether. Either option can injure economic welfare." FTC, supra note 2, at 28.
1
See, e.g., AMERICAN INTELECTUAL PRoPERTY LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 22 (2003) (presenting survey results reporting: (i) the median cost of participating in patent
infringement litigation with less than $1million at risk as $290,000 through discovery and approximately
$500,000 through trial and appeal; (ii) the mcdian cost of participatung in patent infringemcnt litigation
with between $1 million and $25 million at risk as approximately $1 million through discovery and $2
million through trial and appeal; and (iii) the median cost of participating in patent infringement

litigation with more than $25 million at risk as approximately $2,5 million through discovery and $4
million through trial and appeal); Gregory, supranote 14, at 293-94; Magliocca, supranote 16, at 1814-15.
9
Thc altcrnative istoo risky. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556,
1557 (Fed. Cir. 1986), (where court upheld injunctive relief against Kodak for infringing Polaroid's
patented instant camera). It did so despite Kodak's arguments that such relief would result in the loss
of 4,500jobs, $200 million in plant and equipment costs, and would injure Kodak's customers and its
goodwill. See Gregory, sipra note 14, at 293.
Josh Lerner, testifying before the House Subcommittee on Courts. the Internet, and
Intellectual Property explained: "In the past two decades, the United States has strengthened patent rights
while weakening the standards for granting patents." While it was not premeditated, these two policy
changes have created a "perfect storm": a complex and intensifying combination of factors that
increasingly makes the patent system a hindrance rather than a spur to innovation. See Editorial, Patently
Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14, available at http://promotetleprogress.com/ptpfiles/
patentreforn houscoversighr/060905/prcpared/lerner.pdf
1)
See Luxardo, supra note 14, at 795. See generally Bernard Stamler, Batdes of the
Patents, Like

348 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMIBUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:343
First, trolls are "non-practicing entities" ("NPE") that do not practice their
patents within the industry and are, by nature, focused exclusively on
enforcement. 21 In contrast, for industry participants, or patent practicing
entities ("PPE") that obtain strong and extensive patent portfolios, these
portfolios discourage enforcement and often produce reasonable cross-

David v. Goliath,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at G2.
2
The Federal Trade Commission referred to patent trolls using it as a neutral
term in its
October 2003 report SeeFgeerallyFTC,supra note 2. The FTC also added that NPEs are firms that arc,
for a variety of reasons. invulnerable to a countersuit for patent infringement. They may be design firms
that patent their inventions but do not practice them, or patent assertion firms that buy patents from
other companies (particularly bankrupt ones) not to practice but to assert against others. Id. at 31; see also
Yahoo!, supra note 16, at 12.
See Chisum, spia note 1, at 340.
See Patti Waldmeir, Patent Extortion Is the Cost ofBusiness, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at 7,
aailableathttp://search f.coii/nonFtArticle?id= 050317001392 (last visited Miar. 26, 2009). "Patcnts arc
4

like nuclear warheads-even if you never use them, they serve their purpose." Id.; see also Brief for
Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.LC., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05 130) ("Given the inherently rich functionality of
information technology, these phenomena-the automatic injunction rule, the Federal Circuit's other
expansive patentjurisprudence, and the customer orientation of the PTO-havc triggered a patent arms
race. Facing potential liability on a vast scale, companies in the information technology sector hedge
their bets by filing for hundreds ofpatents, expectingthat 'mutually assured destruction' will deter others
from asserting patents against them.").
2See Magliocca. supra note 16, at 1817; Yahoo!, siipra note 16, at 12
16
See Waldmeir, supra note 24, at 7; see also Brief for Computer & Comm. Indus. Ass'n as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 UiS. 388 (2006)
(No, 05-130) ("While portfolio accumulation is a rational strategy against present and potential
competitors, it provides little protection against patent speculation by non-producers. Easily asserted
patents, endowed with automatic injunctive relief. become potent weapons in the hands of nonproducing patent firms, sometimes referred to as 'trolls.' These trolls profit solely fiom holding up
producers, and therefore have no need for cross-licenses and no fear ofmutually assured destruction.").
)7
Magliocca, supra note 16, at
1818.
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media.- Iowever, the negative connotation of the patent troll label has
been criticized, and some scholars contend that this reputation is unmerited
and that the patent troll is merely misunderstood. Supporters of patent
trolls, or NPEs, argue that in the past, large corporations infringed patents
without consequences, stealing the patents of individual inventors and small
companies, and then fought such suits in the hopes of exhausting a plaintiffs
means. ° As a result, individual investors and small companies rarely sought
to enforce their patent rights. 1 Framed in that manner, patent trolling is a
vindication of the rights of the little guy that infuses capital into undercapitalized entities by buying their dormant patents and in the process
making a significant contribution to research and development. 2
Most patent trolls see themselves as defenders of small inventors,

fighting an uphill battle to protect the inventors' hard-earned intellectual
property from pillaging corporate titans. NPEs contend that many of the
criticisms set forth are problems with the patent system itself rather than
with the actions of patent trolls.33 Supporters of patent trolls argue that these
entities, "function with respect to inventions both as venture capital firms
and as market-makers, and facilitate the public disclosure of invention,
which is one of the patent system's primary functions."' 4 In addition, the

See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 9, at K-01 ("There's a newbogeyman haunting corporate America
alongside the crusading white-collar prosecutor and the zealous class-action attorney. The latest predator
to terrorize boardrooms is a creature called the 'patent troll.' This is a patent-holding company that
,8

collects licensing fees from users of its technology and sues those who won't pay "); Patently Ridiculous,
supra note 2, at A24 (" [P] rofitcers, including lawyers and hedge funds, have turned the very purpose of
patent rights

to encourage people to invent and produce

on its head, using them to tax, blackmail and

even shut down productive companies unless they pay high enough ransoms. These so-called patent
trolls have emerged as the villains in this intellectual propcrty dcbate.").

2

See, e.g., Raymond P. Niro, "ow is Really 1Udennii g the Paent Systei-"Patent Trolls" or

Congress?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INrELL PROP. L. 185, 197 ("[N]o one benefits when people use

derogatory terms like 'patent troll' or patent parasite.' Individual inventors and small companies that
cannot afford to commercialize their inventions should not be defamed for choosing to enforce their
patents, nor should the lawyers who defend large companies in patent infringement suits."); Gregory,
supra note 14, at 309 ("The Patent Troll label is an inflammatory and offensive term that has no real
meaning."); See geierallyJones, supra note 10, at 1036-39 (averring that the term "patent troll" unfairly

vilifies the actions of NPEs).
Y,
See Magliocca. sipra note 16, at 1818;Jones, supra note 10, at 1037.
:1
See Jones, supra note 10, at 1037.
1
See Magliocca, supra note 16, at 1818.
33
See, e.g.,Jones, sopra note 10, at 1036 n.7 (citing Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control: The Sipreie
Cour's eBay Decision Sets Back Pesky 'PatentTrolls' orAiierican Innovation, Depending upon hich Side You're
On, A.B.A.J., Sept. 2006, at 51); see also James F. McDonough III, Comment, Iie Myth of the Patent7iol
An Alteiative Vis of the Function oJ Patent Dealers in an Idea Econoiy, 56 EMoRY L.J. 189, 202 (2006).
34
Brief for Rei-brandt IP Management, L.L.C., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
2-3, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 US. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Rembrandt].
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specialized acquisition, licensing, and enforcement functions ofpatent trolls
promote invention and disclosure by freeing up the inventor while the
patent troll "assumes for itself the risks and potential additional rewards of
monetizing the intellectual property in the market."'
Additionally,
supporters claim that the biggest benefit is to the public because without
patent trolls, inventors would not have the time, support, and incentive to
come up with inventions. Furthermore, patent trolls have every incentive
to make inventions available to the public precisely because they do not
manufacture or sell products.3 "
There are many proponents and opponents of the patent troll business
model. However, it is clear that certain activities considered trolling are
legitimate, such as when university researchers or small, independent
inventors license their inventions. In contrast, many entities exploit the
system in attempting to extract exorbitant licensing fees from either
manufacturers or service providers based on alleged infringement of
questionable patents.3 Regardless of how one feels about patent trolls, it is
indisputable that their recent proliferation has been spurred on by certain
features of the current patent system and has subsequently changed the
landscape of patent enforcement.3
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PATENT ACT OF 1952
The Constitution empowers Congress to enact law to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. ' , 40 Patents are property rights and are entitled to the same
protection as other property. 4' The Patent Act of 1952 is the current law

Through purchasing and licensing, patent trolls help make markets in which inventors can profit from
their patents. They do so by increasing liquidity by acting as the middlemen who facilitate transactions
by centralizing exchange processes, thereby lowering transaction costs. Jones, supra note 10, at 1047.
35
Rembrandt, supra note 34, at 7-8, Regular enforcement of patents by patent trolls increases
and deters exploitation, or "free-riding" of patents-copying without compensating inventors. SeeJones,
sopra note 10, at 1044.
Rembrandt, supranote 34, at 9, Actually enforcingthe exclusivity confcrred bythe patent grant
(rather than entering into licensing agreements) would simply deprive the NPE of any revenue. Id.

3
39

See
c Myers, spira note 8, at 337.
See id. at 335.
See Gregory, supra note 14, at 296,

§ 8, cl. 8.
"Holders of valid letters-patent enjoy, by virtue of the same, the exclusive right and liberty
of making and using the invention therein secured, and of vending the same to others to be used, as
provided by the act of Congress; and the rule of law is well settled, that an invention so secured is
property in the holder of the patent, and that as such the right of the holder is as much entitled to
40
41

U.S. CONST. art. I,

2009]

END OFPATENT TROLL ABUSES?

governing patents. 42 The Act attempts to "strike a balance between the
promotion of technological innovation and the dissemination of its fruits."'3
Thus understood, the Act strikes a balance between society and the public
good benefit from the invention but allows the inventor (or patent holder)
to retain all of the rights as a reward for his or her expenditure of time,
effort, and money."4 One of the rights associated with a patent is "the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States.' 4The right of exclusion is amongst the most powerful of those conferred
by the patent, and encourages further innovation by giving patent owners
certain remedies, at law, for infringement. 46 The Patent Act provides that a
court must award the patent owner damages sufficient to compensate for an
infringement. 4' However, the Patent Act also recognizes that pecuniary
damages are not necessarily adequate and that the patent owner often wishes
to halt the infringing activity. 4 Therefore, the Patent Act provides that
courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the
court deems reasonable."' Without the right of an injunction, the patent
system would effectively force patent owners to license their patents
whenever another entity infringes. Such a compulsory licensing system
would run counter to the right of exclusion enshrined in both the
Constitution and the Patent Act. °

protection as any other property, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive right or
privilege is granted." Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 226 (1876) (citation omitted).

41

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §5 1 376 (2000).

13

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPtES OF PATENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (Robert

C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press 2d ed. 2001) (1998).
44

See Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (stating that "the

inventor could have kept his discovery to himself; but, to induce a disclosure of it, Congress has, by its

legislation, made in pursuance of the Constitution guaranteed to him an exclusive right to it for a limited
time, and the purpose of the patent is to protect him in this monopoly[,] not to give him a use which he
did not have before, 'but only to separate hien an exclusive use.'") (quoting United States v, Atnerican

Bell Teleph. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897)).
4,,
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
46
See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Under the
statute... a patent is a form ofa property right, and the right to exclude recognized in a patent is butthe
essence of the concept of property." (citing Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
47
35 U.S C. S 284 (2000). "Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for

the use made of the invention bythe infiinger, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court," See
id.

4'
4'
90

See Myers, supra note 8, at 340.
35 U.S.C. S 283 (2000).
See Myers, supia note 8, at 335.
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III. THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION PRACTICE PRIOR TO
EBAY-THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE PERMANENT
INJUNCTION
The Patent Act states that courts may, in accordance with the principles
of equity, use their discretion to enter a permanent injunction as a remedy
for infringement.51 Traditionally, a plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive
relief must demonstrate:
(1) [T]hat it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction. 5
However, in practice, the general rule under the Patent Act, as
articulated by the CAFC, has been that absent an unusual case, exceptional
circumstances, or in rare instances where necessary to protect the public
interest, "a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged. ,51 Irreparable harm to the patent owner is presumed
and injunctive relief is essentially automatic to a prevailing patentee.5 4 The
permanent injunction has been an extremely powerful, and oft-criticized,

51
52
53

35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
eBay, 547 U.S. at. 391 (2006).
MercExchangc, L.L.C. v. tBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson

v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F,2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). "The traditional law-which did not
worry much about patent trolls essentially held that the injunctive relief came as of right when the
defendant practiced the invention, licensed the invention to others, or warehoused the invention in order
to make better use of some other patented invention within its portfolio." Richard Epstein, Tivo Winds
on lnjunctiie Relief, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, http:/vws.ft,com/cnms/s/2/8c7a66a2-4blO-1 ldc-861a0000779fd2ac.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
,4
This general rule has been criticized. By assuming irreparable harm from infiingement, the
general rule all but nullifies the traditional rule that equitable relief (e g., an injunction) is not granted
unless the plaintiff shows that the remedy at law (e.g , monetary damages) is inadequate. James M.
Fischer, The "Right" to Injunctve Reliefrf PalentIiigement,24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER&HIGH TECH.
L.J 1, 10 11 (Nov. 2007); ee al'o, Yahoo!, supra note 16, at 21 (stating that awarding an autouatic
injunction to an entitythat does not produce socially valuable products, and whose focus is monetizing
patents through litigation, permits it to extort settlements in excess of the true economic value of the
infringed patent by enabling NPEs to threaten to shut dowsn the production of socially useful products
even where the patent owner would suffer no irreparable harm); see alo eBay, 547 U.S. at 1841 (2006)
(Roberts, J., concurring) ("This historical practice, as the Court holds, does not entite a patentee to a
permanent injunction orjustify agenral rule that such injunctions should issue.").
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arrow in the patent troll's quiver." In turn, this has generated criticism that
the courts frequently fail to account for equitable factors and have wrongly
applied a presumption of irreparable harm. Furthermore, many argue that
the near-automatic rule granting injunction simply does not reflect the
current realities of the patent system.5 Thus far, however, patent trolls have
taken shelter under the Court's holding in ContinentalPaper.5 8 The Court
took the opportunity to review its Continental Paper holding that an
injunction may issue despite non-use of the patent, as well as the federal
Circuit's general rule for granting permanent injunctions when it granted
certiorari in eBay.i 9
IV.

EBAY

The eBay case involved a claim by MercExchange-the owner of a
business method patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate sale
of goods among private citizens-that eflay was violating its patent.60

55

As two commentators put it, "the threat of injunctive relief has hung like the sword of

Damocles over accused infringers' heads, giving settlement leverage to patent holders." Rodney R,

Sweetland III & Michael G. McManus, Patently Better Odds the Sipeuie Court's Decision in eBay Weakens
a Patent Reiedy, But Trade Law Still Offers Help, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2006, avallable at
ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Scction =Home&Teinplate =CM/ContentDisplay .cfm&ConteitFilelD
5520l. The realities of patent thickets and submarine patents combined with the threat of injunctionbacked exorbitant royalties may undermine effective competition, raise costs for consumers and frustrate

innovation. See, e.g., Brieffor Nokia Corp. Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130),
5

See Chisur, supranote 1, at 348. Soine scholars disagree, arguingthat the CAFC's general rule

provided much needed clarity and predictability. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 10, at 1051.
57
Brieffor Computer & Commc'n. Indus. Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17,
cBay, Inc v McrcExchange, L.LC., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006WL 235011 ("The patent
system itself has expanded to address a far greater variety of subject matter, a far greater range of
inventive activity, and a far greater scope ofniarket conditions. By advancing a general rule ofinjunctive
relief subject only to rare exceptions, the Federal Circuit embraces a static vision of a patent system
rooted to old paradigms.").
98
Cont'l Paper Bag Co, v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1908) (stating that "it is the
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive" and holding that a
court of equity has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief where a patent owner has declined to use its
patent). The Court in Continental Paper, however, ended its opinion by stating that there could be
situations where, in vicw of the public interest, a court ofcquity mightbejustified in withholding relief
by injunction. See id. at 430.
'9
eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 94.
60
eBay, 547 U.S. at390 see Brief for Respondent at *1-2, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006

WI 622506 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. The Respondent's Brief details that the patent in
question was filed by 7Thomas Woolston, an electrical engineer, patent attorney, and the founder of
MercExchange, L.L.C. See id. at k1. Woolston filed his first patent application involving online
marketing technology in April 1995, months prior to the creation ofcBay. See id. The Bricf goes on to
note that "[t]he family of patents that issued from this parent application includes the only patent of
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Although it developed a business plan and took steps to commercialize,
MercExchange never practiced its patent and ultimately focused on its
licensing program.61 eBay was aware that parts of the technology it was
using as part of its "Buy it Now" feature were covered by MercExchange's
patents. 2 The two parties attempted to reach a licensing agreement, but the
negotiations failed.13 MercExchange then filed4 a patent infringement suit
against eBay and another company, Half.comi6

A. The District Court
At trial, a jury found that eBay willfully infringed upon two of
MercExchanges patents. 6,- Accordingly, the jury awarded MercExchange
$29.5 million in damages. The court recognized the CAFC's general rule
in favor of granting injunctive relief absent sufficient reason for denying it. 7
Despite the presumption in favor of granting equitable relief, the court
applied the traditional four-factor test to determine whether injunctive relief
was appropriate:
(i) [W]hether the plaintiff would face irreparable injury if the
injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in the public

concern here, the 265 patent, The 265 patent describes an 'electronic market' for the sale of goods. In
such a market, sellers can display goods by posting pictures, descriptions, and prices of goods on a
computer network, such as the Internet. Prospective buyers can electronically browse the goods on sale
by connecting to the network. After selecting an item, a buyer can complete the purchase electronically,
with the 'electronic market' mcdiating the transaction, including payment, on the buyer's behalf Thc

seller is then notified that the buyer has paid for the item and that thc transaction is final. A central
authority within the market can police the obligations and performance of sellers and buyers over time,
thereby promoting trust among participants." See id. at *3,
61
See id. at *4. eBay isa "popular Internct Web site that allows private sellers to list goods they
wish to sell, either through an auction or at a fixed price." eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
62
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at *3 (explaining that "from October 1998 through
February 2002, eBay repeatedly acknowledged the 265 patent's significance by filing 24 patent
applications referring to the 265 patent as prior art.").
6
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
64
See id. Halfcom is a wholly owned subsidiary ofeBay that operates a similar Web site. See
id.
65

See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. cBay, Inc., 275 F Supp. 2d 695,722 (E.D, Va. 2003), affd ipart,

rev'd in pait, vacated in part, and remanded, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated aid reiaided,547 U.S.
388 (2006).
66

67

MercExchane, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
See id. at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v.

Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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interest, and (iv) whether the balance of the hardships tips in the
plaintiffs favor. 8
Ultimately, after considering all four factors, the district court denied
MercExchange's motion for a permanent injunction) 9
B. The CAFC
On appeal the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision
denyingthe permanent injunction."' The CAFC deferred to the general rule
and granted a permanent injunction based upon a finding of validity and
infringement." After criticizing the district court's findings," the court went

68

MercExchange, 275 F,Supp. 2d at 711. While applying the four factors, the court noted that

validity and infringement establish a presumption of irreparable harm, but that MercExchange's lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents, its willingness to license, its statements to the media
regarding enforceirent, and its failure to seek a preliminary injunction all weighed against the first two
factors (irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary damages). See id.
at 712. Although the court
commented that monetary damages are typically inadequate, it merely labeled the case at bar "atypical"
without fuither explanation, and held that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. See id.
at 713.
With regard to the third factor, the court found that "the public interest factor equally supports granting
an injunction to protect the plaintiffs patent rights, and denying an injunction to protect the public's
interest in using a patented business method that the patent holder declines to practice." See id. at 714.
Finally, in its examination of the fourth factor, "Balance of the Hardships," the court noted that the case
was among the most contentious it had ever presided over, but nonetheless found that the scales tipped
slightly in favor of eBay. See id. In coming to this conclusion, the court recognized that injunctions
generally serve the public interest in maintaining the integrity ofthe patent system, but also recognized
mounting concern over the growing issuance of business-method patents. See id. at 713 14. The court
then acknowledged that the public does not benefit from patentees vlo obtain a patent, yet decline to
allowthe public to benefit from the inventions contained therein. See id,
at 714. Because MercExchange
exists solely to license or sue to enforce its patents, damages would be sufficient to compensate it for any
damages. Id. at 713. Finally, granting an injunction would lead to extraordinary costs and possibly
ongoing contempt hearings as a result of any eBay design-around strategies. Id.
at 714.
69
See id. at 715.
7
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated aid
remanded, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Id. at 1338 There, the court noted:
[T]he general rulc is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged. To be sure, courts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to
deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest. Thus, we have stated that a court
may decline to enter an in unction when apatentee's failure to practice the patented invention
frustrates an important public need for the invention, such as the need to use an invention to
protect public health.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
See id. at 1339 ("In this case, thc district courtdid not provide anypcrsuasive reason to believe
this case is sufficiently exceptional tojustify the denial of a permanent injunction.").
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on to hold that concerns over business-method patents and costs related to
the likelihood of continuing disputes are not the type of important public
needs thatjustify the unusual step of denying injunctive relief' The court
then ultimately concluded that MercExchange's choice not to practice its
patent and its willingness to license did not deprive it of a valid right to an
injunction.'
C. The Supreme Court's Decision-Justice Thomas' Opinion
Justice Thomas delivered the brief, unanimous opinion of the Court,
which vacated the CAFC'sjudgment and remanded." The Court rejected
the Federal Circuit's general rule and held that permanent injunctions in
patent cases should be evaluated under the traditional four-factor test, noting
that "a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not
be lightly implied. 7 6 Justice Thomas criticized the Federal Circuit's finding
that the statutory right to exclude alone justified the general rule in favor of
permanent injunctive relief." The Justice added that "the creation of a right
is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right," and
that nothing in Section 283 of the Patent Act indicates that Congress
intended a departure from the provision that "injunctions may issue only in
accordance with principles of equity." 8
The Court then applied this reasoning to find that neither the district
court nor the court of appeals properly applied traditional equitable
principles in deciding whether to grant the permanent injunction. Justice
Thomas criticized the district court's adoption of "expansive principles
suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases." 0
In particular, he disagreed with the district court's conclusion that "plaintiff s

7

See id.

74

See id.This case bears a strong resemblance to the Supreme Court's holding in Continental

Paper,as the CAFC makes its
point that inJunctions art not reserved for patentecs who intend to practice

their patents, as opposed to those who choose to license. Id.Rather, the statutory right to exclude is
equally available to both groups, and the right to an adequate remedy to enforce that right should be
equally available to both as well. See id.
79 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.I.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
76

Id.

See id.
at 392-93.
Id.
18
at 392. Justice Thomas' position is consistent with the treattnent of injunctions under the
Copyright Act. See id.at 392-93 ("[A]s in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected
invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically
follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.").
77

7

See id.at 393.

80

Id.
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willingness to license its patents and its lack of commercial activity in
practicing the patents" was sufficient to establish a lack of irreparable harm.81
Justice Thomas also admonished the district court's adoption of a categorical
rule denying injunctive relief to patent holders who chose to license their
patents rather than commercialize them, noting it could not be squared
with
82
equitable principles or the Court's decision in Continental Paper.
D. Chifjustice Roberts' Concurrence
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, began by
agreeing that injunctive relief should be based on traditional standards of
equity. 83 However, the Chief'Justice noted that the long-standing tradition

of granting injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement isjustified "given
the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies,"
which often "implicates the first two tactors of the traditional four-factor
test.,1 4 According to ChiefJustice Roberts, this historical practice does not
justify a general rule that injunctions should automatically issue. Instead,
"there is a difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the
established four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean slate. ,"1
E. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, Justice Kennedy argued
that, contrary to the ChiefJustice's argument, the traditional practice issuing
injunctions "does not seem to rest on the difficulty of protecting a right to
exclude through monetary remedies" and that the right to exclude does not
dictate the remedy for a violation of that right. 6 Justice Kennedy advised
that the historical practice of granting an injunction merely reflects "the
results of the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent" and that this
practice is only instructive, today, when courts are confronted with a case
that is substantially similar.8 When faced with patent infringement cases,

81

See id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va.

2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. Specifically, the court expressed concern that such a rule would

deny patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, who may still be able to satisfy
the traditional fcur-factor test the opportunity to obtain injunctive relief See id.
83
See id. at 394 (Robcrts, J, concurring).
84

See id. at 395.

8,1

Id.

86

Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing id. at 395 (Roberts, J., concurring) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).
87
Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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today's courts must "bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the
patent being enforced and the economic function
of the patent holder
' 8
,1
cases.
earlier
unlike
quite
consideration
present
Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, under certain circumstances

monetary damages are a sufficient remedy. One such case occurs when
"firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees."' 9 These firms may only hold the
patent for a small component of the whole product, and use the threat of
injunction "as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that
seek to buy licenses to practice the patent."g° In addition, Justice Kennedy
found that because of "the potential vagueness and suspect validity" of
business patents, the "calculus under the four-factor test" may be different
in light of the different consequences that may follow from injunctive relief
in such cases. 91
V. ANALYSIS

Although it is a unanimous decision, eBay's two concurrences provide
interesting subtext to an otherwise brief opinion. The decision harmonizes
the test for issuing a permanent injunction in patent cases with that
employed in other areas of the law.9 2 Further, Justice Thomas' divorce of
the right to exclude from the remedy for a violation of that right, makes
manifest that injunctive relief may only issue where the patentee satisfies the
four-factor test.9' Therefore, the factual circumstances of a particular

8

]d.

Id.This description no doubt refers to patent trolls.
19
Id.
91
See id. Business method or process patents are criticized because they protect a process or
method of doing something, rather than the thing itsclf Criticism arises from the tact that it is difficult
to limit the patentable scope of a process or method and also because there is a scarcity of prior art
regarding these patents. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03 [1] (2002).
92
The Supreme Court, 2005 Tenn-Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv.332, 337 (2006)
91
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 392. Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that at least four Justices
may not view the nature of the right to exclude as dispositive in selecting a remedy. However, courts
may still consider the nature of the patent right invaded when deciding in favor of an injunction. They
can do so for the following reasons: the fact that the nature of patent right violations can aid inselection
of the proper remedy, the Court's expressed support for the Continental Paper decision, the wellestablished principle that the nature of the patentee's right militates in favor of an injunction, the Chief
Justice's concurrence expressed clear support for the proposition that the nature of the right to exclude
affects the remedy for its violation, and the Court's acknowledgment that a "patent holder who has
unreasonably declined to use the patent" may nevertheless be entitled to an injunction. Seegenerally
Leading Cases, supra note 92, at 333-41.
90
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infringement case, and not the nature of the patent right itself, play the
greater role in justifying injunctive relief. 4
What is not clear, however, is whether eBay militates in favor of granting
more or fewer permanent injunctions.9 The rejection of a categorical rule
in favor of, or against, injunctive relief reaffirms the role of district courts to
exercise their discretion consistently with equitable principles on a case-bycase basis."t From a general standpoint, the eBay decision does not
recalibrate the existing preference that favors patentees. Htowever, because
the majority opinion did not address the application of the traditional test,
district courts must rely on the two concurrences for guidance.97 Therefore,
courts aiming to maintain the status quo in the issuance of patent
injunctions may rely on the Roberts concurrence, while those seeking to
make obtaining
injunctions more difficult may find refuge in Kennedy's
9
concurrence.

8

This article endorsesJustice Kennedy's approach to injunctive relief and
the approach post-eBay district courts have begun to take for two reasons
touched on above. First, patent trolls exploit patent rights without truly
conferring any benefit upon society, ' and, second, they do not suffer actual,
irreparable harm sufficient to merit an injunction upon a finding of patent
infringement, "" The sections below argue that, to the extent that courts are
confronted with patent holders of the sortJustice Kennedy describes, courts
may deny injunctive relief, thus curbing the mighty patent troll. 1

See Leading Cases, supra note 92, at338. Prior to eBay, the remedy flowed directly from the
nature ofthe right invaded. The fact that the patentee's right to exclude was violated gave great and often
dispositive weight in favor of injunctive relief as opposed to a monetary damages. See id. at 338-39.
1)
See id. at 337.
1)
See Fischer, supra note 54, at 20.
97
See generally id.
c,8 See Rebecca A. Hand, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking at the Cause and hfect of a Shift
in the
Standardfor Issuing
PatentIjuntions, 25 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. LJ.461, 479 (2007).
, ' See Luxardo, supra note 14, at 796. "The patent quid pro quo isthat an inventor gives
something to society by disclosing an invention and society in turns gives the inventor exclusive rights
in that invention for a limited time." Id.
1U0 See Myers, Snpra note 8, at 337.
101
Justice Kennedy described patent licensing companies that do not produce or sell goods and
utilize potentially vague and suspect business method patents. See eBay 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J,
concurring).
94
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For a broad examination of post-eBay cases, see
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Afroemath oJ
FBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Cf. 1837 (2006): A Review of SubseqneutJidicial Decisions, 89 J.PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF.Soc'Y 631, 653-57 (Aug. 2007); Andrei Iancu & W Joss Nichols, Balancing The Four
Factors In PernanentItunction Decisions:
A Review qfPost-EBay Case Lau, 89J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC 'Y395, 397 404 (May 2007).
103
See Benjamin H. Diessel, Trollingfor Troll.s:
The Pifalls
of the Emeiging Market Competition
ReqiiirmifentforPermantiItlnjunctioiisi IPaterit Cas Post-Bay, 106 MIcH. L.RE,. 305,309- 10 (2007). In
fact, courts granting injunctions have focused on lost sales
to the plaintiffor a loss in market share as the
irreparable injury. See id.
at 326.
104 See, e.g.; id.,; see
generally Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 102; Iancu & Nichols, supi-a note 102.
105
"Factors including inventive area,jurisdiction, [willingness ofpatent owner to license], and
willfulness do not sufficiently distinguish the cases granting and denying injunctions such that one can
tell, given these factorsalone, whether an injunction will issue." Diessel, supra note 103, at315. See also
Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 102, at 653-55.
106
See, e.g., Wald v.Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CI-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851
(W.D. Okla.July 27, 2006); Brooktrout, Inc. v.Eicon Networks Corp., No.2:03-CV-59, 2007 WL
1730112 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007); Telequip Corp. v. Change Exch., No. 5:01 CV 1748, 2006 WL
2385425 (N.D.NY.Aug. 15, 2006); TiVo Inc. v.Echostar Commc'ns Corp.,446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D.

Tex. 2006); Floe(Be2(e)aNR-20.5373 -n)61008115, 200.Be2()-l(uO)]TJ-0022 Tcl7.134oOMP( A)E(r)-TI-8(CTI-8(CON S)6(e0)]TJll-0.0
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been remarkably consistent in cases granting injunctions 1 0 Predictably,
plaintiffs denied injunctions typically were not market competitors but were
willing licensors." °8 This recent trend bodes poorly for the patent troll,
whose sole business is licensing and, thus, does not directly compete in the
marketplace.

9

VII. THE "MARKET COMPETITION REQUIREMENT"
NEGATIVELY IMPACTS PATENT TROLLS, BUT THIS (ARGUABLY)
IS A GOOD THING

Post-eBay, it is clear that the district courts have relied more heavily on
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which advocates judicial hostility toward
NPEs or patent trolls."' This indicates that courts do riot deem patent
trolls, or the functions they serve, to be useful,"1 and has resulted in the
systematic denial of injunctive relief to patent trolls. t12 Accordingly, the new
development has arguably created a categorical rule that conflicts with the
eBay majority.113 Further, it begs the question of whether the requirement
of market competition justifiably satisfies the discretionary application of
traditional principles of equity, or, whether it is simply intended to carry out

Diessel, supra note 103, at 321. There does, however, appear to be a slight aberration or
exception to this general rule such that non-profit enterprises like universities and research institutes may
be able to obtain injunctive relief despite being NPEs. See, e.g., Commonwealth Scientific & Indus.
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.NY 2007) (granting permanent
injunction to non-profit research institute whose business model involved licensing and was not a direct
market competitor). This comports withJustice Thomas' opinion for the majority in eBay, 547 U.S. 388
(2006). in which he expressed concern precisely for such entities. See supra note 82.
108
See, e.g., z4 Technologies v. Microsoft, 434 F. Supp.2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Paice v. Toyota
Motor Corp., No. 2:04 CV 211 DF, 2006 WI 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); Voda v. Cordis
Corp.. No. CIV 03 1512 L, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV
Group, Inc, No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006WIL2709206 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1,2006); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte
Fabricating Ltd., No, 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (ED. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
09
See Hand, supra note 98, at 483 84.
110
eBa),, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Iii
See Jones, supia note 10, at 1069.
112
See Jonathan Mucnkcl & Eric Lec, The eBay Effect, IPL NFWSLETTER (Am. Bar Ass'n), Fall
2006, at 20. Patent trolls have been unable to demonstrate irreparable harm or inadequate relief through
damages because they are not direct marketplace competitors. See id.
It3
This is based on the argument that direct market competition is a broad classification and has
led to the type of categorical rule that.Justice Thomas warned could not be squared with traditional
equitable principles. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 93. Benjamin Diessel argues that these broad
classifications have caused courts to selectively apply an impossible standard to non-market-competing
plaintiffs causingthem to flunk the irreparable injury and inadequacy of damages prongs of the four-part
test." Diessel, supra note 103, at 324.
107
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the Supreme Court's underlying goal of denying injunctions to patent
114
trolls.
This article's stance is that the market competition requirement, and the
systematic denial of injunctions to patent trolls, is simply the consequence
of applying the four-factor test to patent troll behavior that itself militates
against injunctive reliet. "' Where a district court encounters plaintiffs of the
patent troll-type justice Kennedy describes in his concurrence, 116 injunctive
reliefwould serve only to vindicate the troll's interest in obtaining licensing
fees and money damages. 11 7
By applying the market competition
requirement, district courts are taking a practical approach in recognizingthe
need to preserve market shares. However, once market shares are not a
concern, which is the case with patent trolls, the need for an injunction is no
longer as pressing."' Therefore, because patent trolls are willing licensors
and non-practicing entities that can be made whole by damages, district
courts can properly exercise their discretion to deny injunctive relief1" 9
Furthermore, the direct market competition requirement and its

application by district courts leads to desirable results.

These include

awarding injunctions to plaintiffs that are market competitors and are losing
market share to infringers, while keepingtrolls at bay by denying injunctions
to attempts to use patents only as part of a profit-making holdup scheme.121
Under this type of regime, patent trolls can no longer coerce exorbitant
settlements " 1 from alleged infringers, 12' as injunctive relief is no longer the

114

See Diessel, supra note 103, at 323 n,132 (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN

REMEDIES 45 (3d ed. Supp, 2006) for the proposition that "The only hint of what should have been the
real issue in eBa
W comes in the penultimate paragraph ofJustice Kennedy's concurring opinion."). Not
surprisingly, that paragraph discusses patent trolls.
115
See Muenktl etal., supa note 112, at20; but if Diessel, supra note 103, at 328 ("Courts apply
a lenient standard when plaintiffs are market competitors and apply a standard that is impossible to meet
when plaintiffs are not market competitors, resulting in an essentially per se denial of injunction to
them.").
116
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395-96 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
It7
The right of exclusive use isjustified on the grounds that it spurs innovation, However, care
must be taken to ensure that the rights of the patentee are balanced against the larger public good.
Granting injunctive relief to patent trolls that seek only money, and not to preserve the exclusivity of the
patent, does not serve the public good. See Fischer, supra note 54, at 28; Hand, supra note 98, at 484.
118
Hand, supra note 98, at 484.
119
Diessel, supra note 103, at 330.
,1(

Id.at 333. The classic
holdup problem occurs where one party threatens another along the

lines of, "I will do something that hurts you more than it helps me unless you pay me not to,"
Id.
121
Where an injunction is the anticipated remedy, patent trolls often seek damages equivalent
to the amount of losses the defendant would avoid if such an injunction, which can lead to major
production and work stoppage, was granted. See id. at 335.
122
This outcome is desirable because it prevents socially and economically harmful licenseseeking behavior from attempting to undermine the patent system.

See Luxardo, supra note 14, at
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likely outcome in litigation initiated by patent trolls. 123 "In this way, the
market competition requirement can be seen as a gatekeeper that lets
through only those plaintiffs who would
not engage in socially costly holdup
124
if they were awarded an injunction."

VIII. CONCLUSION
[P] atent law has always been a dynamic system that seeks to balance
the right of exclusive use that accrues to the patentee with the larger
societal goals of encouraging innovation and
productive use of
12
science and technology for the public good. 5
This article has examined the rise of the patent troll as a product of a flawed
patent system and the Federal Circuit's formerperse rule granting injunctive
relief. The proliferation of these NPEs, along with well-publicized cases
such as the Blackberry case, however, created a strong backlash and the
vilification of patent trolls. Ultimately, this led to eBay and the Court's
reexamination of, in particular, the remedy of injunctive relief
In eBay, the Supreme Court avoided treating injunctive relief as an
entitlement or a preferred remedy. 126 Instead, the Court rejected the per se
rule granting injunctive relief and reestablished the duty of federal district
courts to apply the four-factor test and exercise their discretion to determine
the appropriateness of injunctive relief on a case-by-case basis.1 27 District
courts have successfully begun using the eBay decision, in particularJustice
Kennedy's concurrence, to weed out the growing concerns over the emert2
gence of patent trolls, who abuse the weaknesses in the patent system. 8
Although permanent injunctions are still granted in the majority of
patent infringement cases, they are issued to plaintiffs that are direct market

796-98.
113

This, in turn, will relieve alleged infringers who are undeservingly harmed by the threat of
exorbitant licensing fees on patents that, if litigated, would be ultimately unenforceable. See id. at 801.
124
Diessel, supra note 103, at 336. Diessel, however, also criticizes the market competition
requircmentfor its over-inclusiveness,which he says supplants the gains by possiblyensnaringwould-be
competitors such as small-scale inventors, by wrongly classifying them as patent licensors. See id. at
337 38. This problem could be resolved if district courts are more prudent in applying the market
competition requirement and make sure not to classify wrongly entities that are unlikely to engage in
holdup as patent trolls,
1o,,1 Fischer, suipra note 54, at 28.
1 ,
See id. at 29.
127
See eBay. 547 U.S. at 393-94.
1,8
See Hand, supia note 98, at 484.
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competitors and typically denied to patent owners acting as patent trolls. 29
While the term patent troll may be over-inclusive and district courts should
attempt to ensure that entities are not mislabeled as patent trolls, the
developingjudicial approach has been a reaction to the real-life implications
that the existence of patent trolls presents. This article contends that this is
a positive development in the law, which reflects our dynamic patent law
system, and has provided a roadblock to patent trolls by removing the
certainty of injunctive relief. 3
Without question, the aftermath of eBay has turned the patent troll's
world on its head. The direct market competition requirement now appears
to have become an entrenched doctrine at the district court level, and the
blade ofthe patent troll's mighty sword-injunctive relief-is dulled. Patent
protection now hinges on the presence of commercial activity and direct
market competition. Only
time will tell whether the patent troll's reign has
13
1
end.
an
to
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See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 102, at 657.
See Diessel, supra note 103, at 339; Hand, supra note 98, at 484.
See Hand, supra note 98, at 484.

